---
id: GOV-INTL-001
title: "International AI Governance and Compute Governance"
alternative_names:
  - "Global AI Governance Processes"
  - "Compute Governance"
category: "Safety & Governance → International Governance"
volume: VIII
chapter: 49
entry_type: "Standard Article"
level: 3
status: "Draft"
last_reviewed: 2026-10-18
version: "0.2.0"
prerequisites:
  - "GOV-LAW-001"
related_entries:
  - "GOV-EU-001"
  - "GOV-US-001"
  - "GOV-CN-001"
  - "GOV-EXPORT-001"
  - "ECON-COMP-001"
  - "TECH-HW-001"
  - "SAFE-XRISK-001"
  - "ORG-SAFETY-001"
---

# International AI Governance and Compute Governance

*Status of instruments stated as of 2026-10-18.*

## 1. Concise Definition
International AI governance comprises the treaties, intergovernmental declarations, summit processes and scientific-assessment bodies through which states coordinate policy on AI. Compute governance is a sub-approach that uses control of the computational hardware needed to train and run AI systems as a point of visibility and intervention, because compute is detectable, excludable and quantifiable (Sastry et al., 2024).

## 2. Overview & Significance
No binding global AI treaty with broad membership is in force as of 2026-10-18. International coordination consists mainly of non-binding declarations, summit series, a UN scientific panel and dialogue process, and one regional-plus treaty (the Council of Europe Framework Convention) that has not yet entered into force. National regimes, described in [[GOV-EU-001]](../vol08_safety_governance/GOV-EU-001_the_eu_ai_act.md), [[GOV-US-001]](../vol08_safety_governance/GOV-US-001_united_states_ai_policy.md) and [[GOV-CN-001]](../vol08_safety_governance/GOV-CN-001_chinas_ai_regulation.md), differ substantially, and coordination has been shaped by those differences and by geopolitical competition ([[GOV-EXPORT-001]](../vol08_safety_governance/GOV-EXPORT-001_export_controls_and_ai_geopolitics.md)).

## 3. Historical Development
**Summit series.**
- *Bletchley Park, 1-2 November 2023.* The Bletchley Declaration was signed by 28 countries and the European Union (29 participants); New Zealand joined on 23 October 2024 (UK Government, 2023). It states that "particular safety risks arise at the 'frontier' of AI", says substantial risks may arise from intentional misuse or unintended issues of control, names cybersecurity and biotechnology as areas of special concern, and refers to "potential for serious, even catastrophic, harm, either deliberate or unintentional".
- *Seoul, May 2024.* The AI Seoul Summit was co-hosted by South Korea and the UK on 21-22 May 2024 [VERIFICATION NEEDED: dates and the Seoul Declaration's signatory list were taken from search-result excerpts of government copies; the primary page could not be opened]. The UK Government's "Frontier AI Safety Commitments" page lists 16 original organisations, with four more added (Magic, Minimax, 01.ai, NVIDIA) by its update of 7 February 2025 (UK Government, 2025). These are voluntary company commitments, not state treaty obligations.
- *Paris, 10-11 February 2025.* The "Statement on Inclusive and Sustainable Artificial Intelligence for People and the Planet", published on the Élysée website, lists 65 signatories: 63 countries, the African Union Commission and the European Union. The United States and the United Kingdom are not listed (Élysée, 2025). Media reports of 58 or 61 signatories differ from the official list.
- *New Delhi AI Impact Summit (February 2026).* The "New Delhi Declaration on AI Impact" is described as non-binding. Brookings (12 March 2026) reports that the United States joined 91 countries and international organisations in signing it, with all G7 countries, China and the EU among the endorsers. The count changed over time: search-result excerpts of Indian government (PIB) releases give 88 as of 21 February 2026, 91 by 24 February and 92 in later releases, and other outlets give 89 [VERIFICATION NEEDED: PIB pages returned access-denied; current official count not confirmed]. The agenda shifted toward adoption and development. Switzerland announced a follow-on summit in Geneva in 2027 (Brookings, 2026).

**United Nations.** The General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/79/325 by consensus on 26 August 2025, establishing an Independent International Scientific Panel on AI (40 members) and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance. The panel's co-chairs, elected 3 March 2026, are Yoshua Bengio and Maria Ressa. A preliminary report was released on 1 July 2026, and the first Global Dialogue was held in Geneva on 6-7 July 2026; the second is scheduled for May 2027 in New York (United Nations, 2026). The panel states it is not a regulatory body and does not set rules.

**Council of Europe.** The Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (CETS No. 225) is the first binding international AI treaty. The Dutch government treaty database lists the European Union as ratifying on 15 May 2026, and no other ratification, alongside signatures from 20 other parties (Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Georgia, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, San Marino, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay); the earliest listed signature is dated 5 September 2024 (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs treaty database; snapshot date not stated). Search-result excerpts describing Article 30 say entry into force requires five consent-to-be-bound expressions including at least three by Council of Europe member states, followed by a three-month period. On that basis the Convention was not in force on 2026-10-18 [VERIFICATION NEEDED: coe.int Treaty Office pages returned 403 and the Convention text was not read; current ratification count and Article 30 wording not confirmed first-hand].

## 4. Technical / Conceptual Explanation
**Why compute.** Sastry et al. (2024) argue that compute is a tractable governance lever for three reasons: it is detectable (physical, energy-intensive facilities), excludable (it can be withheld, as with export controls), and quantifiable (it can be counted in floating-point operations). They identify three uses: increasing regulatory visibility, allocating resources toward beneficial uses, and enforcing restrictions on irresponsible or malicious development. They also warn of risks to privacy, the economy and power concentration if designed badly.

**Thresholds.** Regulatory thresholds based on training compute include the EU AI Act's presumption of systemic risk above $10^{25}$ floating-point operations (Article 51(2); see [[GOV-EU-001]](../vol08_safety_governance/GOV-EU-001_the_eu_ai_act.md)) and California's SB 53 definition above $10^{26}$ (secondary sources; see [[GOV-US-001]](../vol08_safety_governance/GOV-US-001_united_states_ai_policy.md)). A cumulative-FLOP threshold is a proxy: it can be crossed by efficient large runs or avoided by smaller, more capable models, and is revised periodically. How FLOPs are counted is itself a measurement choice (see [[ECON-COMP-001]](../vol09_economy/ECON-COMP-001_compute_economics.md)).

**Mechanisms discussed in the literature.** Compute accounting and reporting, know-your-customer duties for cloud providers, export controls, and hardware-enabled monitoring. Sastry et al. describe which are piloted and which need research; this article does not claim any international verification regime is operating.

## 5. Types, Components & Classifications
| Type | Examples | Binding? |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Treaty | Council of Europe Framework Convention | Binding on parties once in force; not yet in force |
| Declarations | Bletchley (2023), Delhi (2026) | Non-binding |
| UN process | Scientific Panel, Global Dialogue (A/RES/79/325) | Non-binding; advisory |
| Standards | ISO/IEC, NIST (see [[ORG-STANDARDS-001]](../vol10_people_organizations/ORG-STANDARDS-001_standards_bodies_iso_iec_nist.md)) | Voluntary unless referenced in law |
| Scientific assessment | International AI Safety Report, chaired by Yoshua Bengio (2026 edition presented at Delhi per Brookings) | Advisory |
| Compute governance | Export controls, thresholds, reporting | National law |

Safety institute networks are covered in [[ORG-SAFETY-001]](../vol10_people_organizations/ORG-SAFETY-001_ai_safety_institutes_and_research_organizations.md).

## 6. Applications & Concrete Examples
Concrete applications of compute governance are national: the EU threshold and US export controls. Internationally, the UN panel has produced a preliminary report (1 July 2026) and a thematic brief on AI agents and misalignment (advance unedited version dated 21 September 2026 per the UN FAQ). No multilateral compute-monitoring body exists in the sources reviewed.

## 7. Advantages, Limitations & Unresolved Questions
- *Advantages*: shared risk vocabulary, evidence pooling, low commitment cost.
- *Limitations*: non-binding outputs; divergent positions (the US reportedly rejects binding international AI rules and new global governance bodies, per Brookings, 2026); inconsistent signatory lists; summit agenda drift between safety and adoption.
- *Contested*: whether international verification of compute use is technically and politically feasible; whether compute thresholds track risk. Evidence is limited to proposals and early pilots (Sastry et al., 2024).

## 8. Current State of Knowledge
As of 2026-10-18: declarations exist but no binding multilateral AI-safety regime with major-power membership is in force. A UN panel and dialogue are operating. The Council of Europe treaty awaits entry into force. Compute governance is implemented only through national and EU measures.

## 9. Future Trajectory & Strategic Outlook
Scheduled events: the second Global Dialogue (2027) and a Geneva summit (2027). These are announcements, not forecasts. No quantified forecast is registered here; see `FCST-REG-001`. Proposals for international compute verification remain hypothetical.

## 10. Related Entries & Knowledge Graph
- **Foundational Concepts**:
  - [[GOV-LAW-001] Global AI Governance & Regulation](../vol08_safety_governance/GOV-LAW-001_ai_governance.md)
  - [[SAFE-XRISK-001] Existential Risk from AI](../vol08_safety_governance/SAFE-XRISK-001_existential_risk.md): risk framing behind frontier-focused declarations.
- **Related Methods & Technologies**:
  - [[TECH-HW-001] AI Hardware](../vol03_technical/TECH-HW-001_ai_hardware.md): the hardware being governed.
  - [[ECON-COMP-001] The Economics of Compute and Scaling](../vol09_economy/ECON-COMP-001_compute_economics.md)
- **National regimes**:
  - [[GOV-EU-001] The EU AI Act](../vol08_safety_governance/GOV-EU-001_the_eu_ai_act.md)
  - [[GOV-US-001] United States AI Policy](../vol08_safety_governance/GOV-US-001_united_states_ai_policy.md)
  - [[GOV-CN-001] China's AI Regulation](../vol08_safety_governance/GOV-CN-001_chinas_ai_regulation.md)
  - [[GOV-EXPORT-001] Export Controls and AI Geopolitics](../vol08_safety_governance/GOV-EXPORT-001_export_controls_and_ai_geopolitics.md)

## 11. References & Foundational Literature
1. Sastry, G., Heim, L., Belfield, H., Anderljung, M., Brundage, M., Hazell, J., O'Keefe, C., Hadfield, G. K., Ngo, R., Pilz, K., Gor, G., Bluemke, E., Shoker, S., Egan, J., Trager, R. F., Avin, S., Weller, A., Bengio, Y., & Coyle, D. (2024). *Computing Power and the Governance of Artificial Intelligence*. arXiv:2402.08797 (submitted 13 February 2024). https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08797. [Compute as a governance lever: detectable, excludable, quantifiable; proposed uses and risks. Preprint: Preliminary evidence].
2. UK Government. (2023). *The Bletchley Declaration by Countries Attending the AI Safety Summit, 1-2 November 2023*. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-safety-summit-2023-the-bletchley-declaration/the-bletchley-declaration-by-countries-attending-the-ai-safety-summit-1-2-november-2023. [Signatories (28 countries plus EU; New Zealand joined 23 October 2024) and frontier-risk statements].
3. United Nations. (2026). *Independent International Scientific Panel on AI: FAQ*. https://www.un.org/independent-international-scientific-panel-ai/en/faq. [A/RES/79/325 adoption date (26 August 2025, by consensus), panel size, co-chairs, report and dialogue dates, non-regulatory status].
4. Kerry, C. F., & Tabassi, E. (2026, March 12). Brookings Institution. *Sovereignty, safety, and scale: Takeaways from the India AI Impact Summit*. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/takeaways-from-the-india-ai-impact-summit/. [Tier 4: Delhi Declaration, non-binding, endorsements, US position, 2027 Geneva follow-on].
5. Council of Europe. *Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (CETS No. 225)*. https://www.coe.int/en/web/artificial-intelligence/the-framework-convention-on-artificial-intelligence. [Treaty identity; coe.int returned 403 and was not retrieved. Ratification status taken from the Dutch treaty database and search excerpts: VERIFICATION NEEDED].
6. European Parliament & Council of the EU. (2024). *Regulation (EU) 2024/1689*. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj. [Adopted 13 June 2024, published in the Official Journal 12 July 2024; Article 51(2) $10^{25}$ FLOP presumption, read on EUR-Lex].
7. UK Government. (2025). *Frontier AI Safety Commitments, AI Seoul Summit 2024* (updated 7 February 2025). https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/frontier-ai-safety-commitments-ai-seoul-summit-2024/frontier-ai-safety-commitments-ai-seoul-summit-2024. [Original 16 and four added organisations].
8. Élysée. (2025). *Statement on Inclusive and Sustainable Artificial Intelligence for People and the Planet* (11 February 2025). https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2025/02/11/statement-on-inclusive-and-sustainable-artificial-intelligence-for-people-and-the-planet. [Signatory list: 63 countries, African Union Commission, EU; US and UK not listed].
9. Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law* (treaty database entry). https://treatydatabase.overheid.nl/en/Treaty/Details/013947_p. [Signature and ratification list; snapshot date not stated].

## 12. Evidential Classification Matrix
| Section / Claim | Evidence Category | Supporting Source | Confidence / Status |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Bletchley Declaration contents | Established | Ref 2 | High |
| UN panel and dialogue facts | Established | Ref 3 | High |
| Delhi Declaration endorsement count | Contested (sources 88-92) | Ref 4 | Low on number |
| Council of Europe treaty status | Preliminary | Ref 9, Ref 5 (not retrieved) | Moderate-Low |
| Seoul and Paris summit facts | Established (Paris list); Preliminary (Seoul) | Ref 7, Ref 8 | High (Paris); Low (Seoul Declaration) |
| Compute as governance lever | Preliminary (argued in a preprint) | Ref 1 | Moderate |
| Feasibility of international compute verification | Hypothetical | Ref 1 | Low |

## 13. Revision History
- **v0.1.0** (2026-10-15): Initial draft. Citations checked against official pages where marked; not independently fact-checked.
- **v0.2.0** (2026-10-18): Fact-check audit (docs/audits/GOV-INTL-001_audit.md). Corrected Bletchley wording, Paris signatory list, UN Global Dialogue 2027 date, Delhi Declaration name and count range; added Seoul and Council of Europe detail; status stays Draft.